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Abstract
We consider a policy game between a high-income country hosting a
drug innovator and a low-income country hosting a drug imitator. The
low-income country chooses whether to enforce an International Patent
Regime (strict IPR) or not (weak IPR) and the high-income country
chooses whether to allow parallel imports (PI) of on-patent drugs or
market based discrimination (MBD). We show that, for a moderately
high imitation cost, both (Strict IPR, Parallel Imports) and (Weak IPR,
MBD) emerge as the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) policy
choices. For relatively smaller imitation costs, (Weak IPR, MBD) is the
unique SPNE policy choice. The welfare properties reveal that although
innovation may be higher at the (Strict IPR, PI), the market coverage
and national welfare of the low-income country, and the total welfare are
all lower. This opens up the e!ciency issue of implementing TRIPS and
at the same time allowing international exhaustion of patent rights.
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1 Introduction
The trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS) agreement
is binding on all the member countries of the World Trade Organization
(WTO). However, over the last two decades, implementation of TRIPS by
developing countries, particularly for the pharmaceutical products, has been
Þercely debated and politically contested. Such debate has often been linked
to the desirability of allowing pharmaceutical companies to implement price
discrimination across countries by prohibiting parallel imports of drugs. This
paper considers a policy game between a low-income and a high-income country
over patent protection and international exhaustion of patent rights (or parallel
imports) of an on-patent drug. The equilibrium government policies and their
welfare properties, along with their implications for the level of innovation of
the drug, are analyzed. (I HAVE MOVED THIS)
The main argument in favour of TRIPS is that it will accelerate innovations
of drugs and therefore improve the quality of health care which will beneÞt
developing and developed countries alike. However, whatever little evidence
can be gathered does not seem to suggest that TRIPS will have any
signiÞcant positive impact on innovation in the developing world [Primo Braga
(1990)]. This is because not only investments in basic R&D and costs of full
development of a commercial drug are very high, but also most of the developing
countries, with notable exceptions like India (TAKE THIS OUT THE
FOOTNOTE SEEMS TO SUGGEST OTHERWISE AND IT DOES
NOT SUPPORT OURCASE ANYWAY), lack the technological capability
and skill to undertake basic R&D [Lall (2003)].1(IN THE FOOTNOTE
I WOULD JUST PUT THE REFERENCES) Developing countries
argue that TRIPS implementation will lead to closing down of business for
a signiÞcantly large number of Þrms operating in the developing countries and
loss of market access for the poor patients as a consequence of monopoly pricing
of drugs by the patent-holder multinational corporations (MNCs). There are
two primary stakeholders in this argument. First are the small and medium
pharmaceutical Þrms in India, China and Brazil, in particular, which under
their weak IPR regimes have specialized in imitation and development of new
processes of producing drugs innovated in the developed world. The second are
the poor patients not only in these countries but also in Asia, Latin America and
sub-Saharan Africa who beneÞted from cheap imports of such drugs from India,
China and Brazil.(I WOULD EITHER FOOTNOTE THIS OR TAKE
OUT)
Interestingly, the possibility of cross-country price discrimination by patent-
holder MNCs under TRIPS has raised similar concerns of accessibility to new
1Chadha (2008) observes that the nature of R&D even in India is mostly adaptive rather
than basic. The other notable feature is that although a few large Indian pharmaceutical
Þrms have developed new molecules, they have then licensed them out at the initial stages of
clinical development to the MNCs in the West. Thus, the beneÞts from such R&D remain far
below the potential. On the other hand, based on a case study of 40 bio-pharmaceutical Þrms
in India, Ramani and Maria (2005) observes that TRIPS is unlikely to have any incentive for
local Þrms to become Þrst innovators.
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drugs for the poor in the rich world as well. To address these concerns,
the WTO now allows countries to implement their own rules of exhaustion
of patent rights once an on-patent drug is marketed. Under Article Six of
TRIPS, countries can allow parallel imports (henceforth, PI) of an on-patent
drug from the low-priced low-income countries without the permission of the
patent-holder MNC.(I WOULD PUT IN FOOTNOTE) Understandably,
however, a wide variation in the national rules for exhaustion among the rich
countries is observed.2 Whereas Japan allows international exhaustion and the
EU allows regional exhaustion of patented goods, USA allows only national
exhaustion of patents and copyrights to protect the interests of their MNC-
exporters.( I WOULD TAKE OUT, IT DOESNT RELATE TO OUR
MODEL I THINK.)
This has given an interesting twist to the IPR regime for pharmaceutical
and other products.3(AGAIN, I WOULD FOOTNOTE OR TAKE
OUT, IT DOESNT RELATE TO OUR MODEL) Whereas product
patent under a strict IPR(WE HAVE NOT DEFINED WHAT THIS
IS YET, I WOULD TAKE OUT) regime may deny market access for
the poor in the developing countries, the situation is apprehended to be
worsened further by parallel imports allowed by the rich countries to ensure
market access for the poor in their own countries. The reason is simple.
Parallel imports of on-patent drugs from low-income countries will lead to
convergence of country-speciÞc prices of drugs and thus the poor (as well
as the rich) in the low-income countries will be worse-o . 4 At the
extreme, the MNC may not cater to the poor countries at all [Malueg and
Schwartz (1994)].(I WOULD SHORTEN AND FOOTNOTE, THE
IMPLICATION SEEMS CLEAR ENOUGH) There have been, therefore,
oppositions to rich countries implementing international exhaustion of patent
rights. Thus, national interests have not only diered among the rich countries,
but also across the rich and poor countries.(I WOULD TAKE THIS OUT
SINCE AS THERE IS ONLY ONE TYPE OF RICH COUNTRY IN
OUR MODEL)
What appears is that beneÞts of TRIPS  both product patent and ßexible
clauses and exceptions like PI (TAKE OUT) are neither unequivocal nor
uniform across nations, and ensuring market access for poor patients is the
common element in both not implementing a strict IPR (i.e., not allowing
product patent) and allowing PI.
Since PI adversely aects innovation as shown by Valletti (2006) of late,
there has been an equally interesting conßict between a strict IPR and allowing
PI in terms of generating incentives for innovation. The relevant issue that
crops up in these perspectives is that can these conßict of interests in co-
2See Maskus (2001).
3 International exhaustion of patent rights has been applied in a wide range of products
apart from the pharmaceutical products.
4 The general theoretical consensus is that price convergence makes the richer countries
unambiguously better o but the poorer countries unambiguously worse-o (Danzon (1998),
Maskus (2001), Richardson (2002)).
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implementing these two policies be resolved in terms of national welfare levels
that incorporate eects of these policies on both the market access for poorer
buyers and the innovation of drugs and health care? Alternatively, if strict and
weak IPR regimes in developing world and the alternative rules of exhaustion
in the rich countries are evaluated in terms of national welfare levels. (I
WOULD TAKE OUT, WE MENTION VALETTI LATER AND
THE IMPLICATION ON INNOVATION HAS ALREADY BEEN
MENTIONED). We consider a policy game between a low-income and a high-
income country over patent protection and international exhaustion of patent
rights (or parallel imports) of an on-patent drug. We analyze the equilibrium
government policies and the welfare properties of those policies, depending on
the optimal prices and qualities set by the Þrms under each policy framework.
Our welfare analysis is motivated by the recognition in Article 7 of TRIPS
that the protection and enforcement of TRIPS should be conducive to social
and economic welfare. Of course, commitment of countries like India to
implement TRIPS and a strict IPR regime as a member of the WTO has left
them with no option to exercise such a choice any longer. However, there are
certain ßexibilities and exceptions within the scope of TRIPS that allow country-
speciÞc variations in the implementation of a stronger IPR regime. Article 27(1)
of TRIPS speciÞes that patents will have to be provided for inventions which are
new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application, but
does not elaborately deÞne these terms. This provides some ßexibility to the
developing countries to restrict the number of patents [Abbott (2001), Correa
(2000a)]. On the other hand, the exception that is particularly relevant for
the developing countries and provides us another motivation for considering a
policy choice regarding the IPR regime is compulsory licensing (hereafter, CL)
by which a non-patentee can obtain license and compete with the patent-holder
by paying a nominal (or often non-existent) royalty to the patent-holder through
the national governments.5 In essence, a CL is similar in eect to the threat
of imitation as it lowers the price of drugs in the developing countries through
price competition. We, however, do not conÞne ourselves to the case of CL, but
put our concern in a more broader policy perspective of weak IPR protection.
(I WOULD TAKE THIS OUR OR SHORTEN AND PUT IN A
FOOTNOTE) An evaluation of alternative IPR regimes in tandem with policy
choices of rich countries in favour of PI will help us understand the welfare basis
of the reservations in the developing world against implementing a strict IPR
regime. It will also help us explain historically observed weak IPR regimes in
the developing world and the recent trend of PI being implemented by the rich
world as optimal choices in a non-cooperative policy choice framework. This is
5 In the amendment of the Indian Patent Act of 1970 in 1999, in keeping with Indias
commitments for implementation of TRIPS with eect from the year 2005, a mailbox facility
was created by which all applications claiming pharmaceutical inventions would be accepted
and put away in a mailbox to be examined in 2005. By this mailbox facility, applications
would be judged for novelty on the basis of Þling date and not with reference to 2005. The act
provides that in regard to the mailbox applications that result in the grant of patents, an
automatic CLs would be issued to those generic companies that made signiÞcant investment
and were producing and marketing a drug covered by the mailbox application prior to 2005.
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the important policy issue that we are primarily concerned with in this paper.(I
HAVE MOVED THIS)
The theoretical literature on patent policy, imitation and innovation, on the
one hand, and on PI, innovation and welfare, on the other hand, have been quite
exhaustive but disjoint except for the study by Ichino (2004). In the literature on
imitation and innovation, two recent papers have some relevance for our analysis.
First is the analysis of Kovac and Zigic (2007) that examines optimal trade policy
choice when in a vertically dierentiated developing country market a quality-
leader developed-country Þrm faces the threat of imitation and learning from a
follower developing-country Þrm. They argue that an optimal tari imposed by
the developing country government encourages imitation, and when marginal
e!ciencies of Þrms investment in qualities is small, it can even lead to quality
reversals (or leapfrogging). However, when quality reversals do not occur, the
tari policy lowers welfare below the free trade level. The other analysis is that
of Sohn (2007) that argues that by welfare criterion, imitation may be weakly
regulated. The investment to innovate shrinks when the innovator faces the
threat of imitation by his rival, but there is also the beneÞt arising from cost
reduction through imitation. Thus, although imitation weakens the incentive
for (cost-reducing) innovation, it can beneÞt the society on the whole. This
result has some direct relevance in the present context. However, none of these
papers have put their analyses in the speciÞc context of pharmaceutical industry
or products that are subject to PI.
The existing literature on PI, innovation and welfare, on the other hand, has
evolved under the implicit assumption of strict IPR regime across the globe.
Thus, how does the choice of rich countries over allowing and not allowing PI
depend on the threat of imitation of innovated drug has not been addressed.
The adverse long run eect of parallel imports under the assumption of partial
coverage of markets demonstrated of late by Valetti (2006), however, has some
relevance for the issues that we address here. As the proÞt of the MNC is lower
under uniform pricing, parallel imports or international exhaustion of patent
rights ex ante lowers the level of innovation of a new drug.6
The only paper, to best of our knowledge, that links these two literature
and provides a benchmark for the issue raised here is that of Ichino (2004). He
considers a policy game between a low-income country choosing over allowing
and not allowing piracy and a high-income country choosing over allowing
and not allowing PI. In such a context, the possibility of piracy signiÞcantly
alters the welfare eect of PI. Whereas piracy is a dominant strategy for the
low-income country, choice of PI by the high-income country depends on the
population density in the low-income country and the dierence in the highest
income parameter of the countries. Though Ichino draws his motivation from
6This analysis has been extended to all equilibrium market-coverage combinations
(including full coverage of all country-markets) by Acharyya (2008). It has been established
that the global welfare under PI is lower than that under market based discrimination when
the markets are partially covered. On the other hand, under full market coverage, the global
welfare under PI increases only when the market sizes (or intra-country demand dispersions)
are su!ciently small.
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PI of Japanese pop music compact disks sold by the Japanese Þrms in China,
Hong Kong and Taiwan, his analysis is equally relevant in the context of
pharmaceutical pricing and patent protection policies.
However, Ichinos analysis is deÞcient in one important respect. By assuming
exogenously given quality level of the on-patent intellectual property right
product, he neglects the adverse eect of both PI and piracy (or imitation)
on the level of innovation and consequently the quality of the product. But
given the adverse innovation eect of PI as mentioned above the incentive for
poorer countries for allowing imitation when the rich country allows PI may be
smaller as well since those who buy the innovated drug instead of the imitated
drug are strictly worse o. Policy choices, therefore, should be re-examined
taking into account the adverse innovation eects of PI and imitation (or weak
IPR regime). This is one of the major analytical departure of the present paper
from that of Ichino (2004).
There are several other important dimensions in which the present analysis
diers from that of Ichino (2004). First, observing the price-setting power of
the Indian pharmaceutical Þrms even for the imitated drugs and medicines,
we assume a single potential imitator instead of perfectly competitive imitators.
Even under the Patent Act 1970 that allowed imitation, reverse engineering and
patents for new processes in India till it was being replaced by the Patent Act
1999, the entry of Þrms had never been to the extent of eroding all proÞt margins
for the incumbents and new entrants. One reason why imitating Þrms could
still enjoy positive supernormal proÞts even under a weak patent protection
may be the Þxed costs involved in imitation and reverse engineering which
essentially restricted entry. Second, we consider a leader-follower structure in
the innovation-imitation subgame similar to Kovac and Zigic (2007) except for
that we do not allow for any quality reversal through imitation, for there is
no such evidence even for Indian pharmaceutical Þrms who have the technical
and manpower skills as mentioned above. That is, we assume pharmaceutical
industries in dierent countries dier in their ability to produce innovative drugs.
(From this point onward next few paragraphs are re-oriented to
accommodate Referee#1s minor comments (iv)).Third, we assume that
the imitator must incur in a Þxed cost so as to be able to imitate. Once this has
been paid, the imitator can produce a quality level anywhere below that of the
innovation. This opens up a wider strategy set for the innovator as we deÞne
below.
The structure of the model is as follows. We characterize the two-country
global economy, a high-income country (H) and a low-income country (L),
having both intra and cross country income disparity. There is a non-
empty interval of consumers in each country, the location of each consumer
in an interval being determined by his income level. A key assumption is
that the intervals are not too far apart and that the richest consumer in H
is richer than the richest consumer in L. The utility of the representative
consumer is increasing in the quality level of the drug and decreasing in its
price. The Þrm in H has the technology to innovate a new drug while the
Þrm in L only has the technology to produce an imitation. Whether or not
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the L-Þrm is allowed to produce an imitation is determined by whether the
L-government enforces a weak-IPR regime (imitation allowed) or strict-IPR
regime (imitation not allowed). The sequence of events in the policy game played
by the governments is as follows. First, national governments simultaneously
(and without communicating) choose their policy regimes. For H, where the
innovator Þrm is based (the higher income country), the policy choice consists
of allowing parallel imports (PI ) or letting the Þrm implement market based
price discrimination (hereafter, MBD). For L, where only imitation is possible,
the policy choice consists of allowing imitation (weak IPR) or not (strict IPR).
Second, the H-Þrm determines the quality of the innovation. Under a weak IPR
regime in the low-income country, this innovating Þrm decides upon whether to
accommodate or deter entry of the potential local imitator in L. If it decides
to deter entry, it innovates a limit quality7 . Third, the L-Þrm determines the
quality of the imitation (if accommodated). Fourth, the innovator and imitator
set their prices. Finally, the consumers in each country decide whether to buy
the drug and, if relevant, which one to buy.
Within this frameowrk, we derive the following results.First, for moderately
high Þxed costs of imitation in the sense deÞned later, we have multiple sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium (henceforth, SPNE) policy pair: (Weak IPR,
MBD) and (Strict IPR, PI). Second, for relatively lower Þxed cost (Weak IPR,
MBD) emerges as the unique SPNE. Thus, at a SPNE, regardless of the level
of Þxed cost of imitation, entry deterring strategy and limit quality are never
realized because the low-income country never implements a weak IPR when
the innovator deters entry. Third, the welfare properties of the two SPNE
reveals that though innovation may be higher at the (Strict IPR, PI)-SPNE
than at the (Weak IPR, MBD)-SPNE regime depending on the cross-country
income disparity, the market coverage and national welfare of the low-income
country and the total welfare all are lower. This opens up the e!ciency issue of
implementing TRIPS (or strict IPR) and at the same time allowing international
exhaustion of patent rights since the optimal response of MNC based countries
to TRIPS implementation would be to allow parallel imports.
The nature of SPNE policy choices, multiple or unique, provides a theoretical
support for the historically observed policy choices in the developed and
developing countries. A SPNE policy choice (multiple or unique) always involves
a weak IPR implemented by the low-income country. The result also provides an
explanation for the interests of the rich countries in enforcing product patents
and at the same time allowing international or regional exhaustion of patent
rights. The potential threat of imitation forces the high-income country not to
allow international exhaustion of patents (and thus not to allow PI), because
the full potential beneÞts from PI cannot be realized. But when the threat of
imitation is eliminated through implementation of a strict (and uniform) IPR
regime across the globe under the WTO commitments, the potential beneÞts
7 In the literature on strategic competition between Þrms in a vertically dierentiated
market, Þrms are usually assumed to commit on their quality levels Þrst and then compete in
prices. See Shaked and Sutton (1982) for example. Donnenfeld and Weber (1995) and Lutz
(1997), on the other hand, considered limit qualities set by incumbent Þrms to deter entry.
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from PI can be fully realized and this is more desirable than MBD for the rich
country.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the basic
assumptions and structure of our analytical framework. The Þrm strategies and
innovation choices are derived in section 3. Section 4 examines the SPNE policy
choices. Section 5 discusses the properties of the two SPNE policy choices, and
reexamine the policy choices considering compulsory licensing allowed by the
low-income country. Finally, concluding remarks are made in section 6.
2 The analytical framework
Let us consider a two-country world, we refer to these two countries as rich
or high-income country (H) and a poor or low-income country (L). These
countries dier in a number of ways. First, although we assume that personal





, we also assume that both the richest and poorest consumer in
country H have a higher level of income than those in country L, i.e., |K A |O
and |K A |O. This reßects the existence of income inequality both within
and across countries. A consumer in country-j with income y allocates
his income over a composite consumption good and a drug. The
composite consumption good is taken as the numeraire and its price
is normalized to unity. Each consumer buys, if at all, only one unit of
the drug.To take care of Referee #1s main comments #2, I would
like to drop the reference of the numeraire good and rewrite the
above two sentences in bold as the following. A consumer in country-
j with income | buys, if at all, only one unit of the drug. The potential buyers
in country-j are distributed uniformly over the relevant income range [|m > |m ]




is the extent of (intra-
country) demand dispersion.8 As we will see, as long as |m is su!ciently small
relative to |m so that it pays for a patent-holder MNC to only partially cover both
these markets, these assumptions really do not matter for our results. All that
matters is that the richest buyers in the H-country are richer than the richest
buyers in the L-country (i.e., |K A |O), but at the same time they are not too
rich in the sense |K ? 3|O. Of course, the extent of market coverage should be
endogenously determined as we elaborate below and can indeed inßuence the
policy choices, but we will conÞne ourselves in this paper with partial coverage of
both markets. The reason for this is that the increased market access argument
for imitation and PI makes sense when initially the markets are not fully covered.
The second way in which our two countries dier is the ability of
their pharmaceutical industry to perform basic R&D research. There is a
pharmaceutical Þrm located in the H-country which develops a new drug with
8Note that the total population size may still be larger and income disparity wider in the
low-income country relative to the high-income country.
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quality indexed by v A 0. Innovation requires investment of a sum of money F




We also have a pharmaceutical Þrm in country L, but this Þrm is unable
to improve on the quality produced by the innovator Þrm. However, once the
imitation technology has been acquired at a cost F, this Þrm can produce a
drug of any quality v ? v. To simplify the analysis, we assume there are no
production and distribution costs whatsoever for any of the two Þrms.
Finally, the dierences in the pharmaceutical industries result in dierences
in the policies available for implementation in each of the two countries.
Whereas an IPR regime is strictly enforced and monitored in the H-country,
in the L-country the local government may choose to implement a weak IPR
regime, which would allow imitation. On the other hand, the H-country must
choose whether or not to allow parallel imports of the drug innovated by its own
Þrm and sold in the L-country. If parallel imports are not allowed, the innovator
Þrm will be able to price discriminate across countries.
All consumers everywhere value the innovated quality of the drug as it
directly beneÞts them in terms of better eectiveness of curing the disease for
which it is used. Thus it pays for the innovator to develop a higher quality
if the additional revenue at least covers the additional investment in R&D.
But, though every consumer values a higher quality drug more than a lower
quality drug, these valuations vary across consumers with dierent incomes.
More precisely, following the literature on quality choice we assume that richer
buyers attach an even higher valuation to a better quality drug relative to a
lower quality drug than do the poorer buyers. This means that the marginal
willingness-to-pay for a quality varies across dierent income levels in each
country9 . (This footnote is added to take care of Referee#1s
comments (1)) Assume that such a preference relationship is linear in income
and quality so that if a consumer purchases a drug of quality v>
Ym(|> v) = |v ; | 5 [|m > |m ]> m = O>K= (2)
Since each buyer buys only one unit of the drug, the net utility equals,
ym(|> v> Sm) = |v  S m > (3)
where S m is the price of the v quality drug charged in country-j.
9Here we follow the speciÞcation used in Ichino (2004) and in our earlier analyses [Acharyya
and Garcia-Alonso (2005, 2007)]. See Gabszweicz and Thisse (1979) and Shaked and Sutton
(1982) for relating the marginal willingness-to-pay for a quality to income levels of consumers
in the context of endogeneous quality choice. An alternative basis of dierences in the marginal
willingness-to-pay for a quality can be taste diversities, rather than income disparities, as in
Mussa and Rosen (1978). Of course, one might argue, and this may be particularly relevant for
health care, that rich and poor alike have the same marginal willingness-to-pay for a particular
quality but dierent ability to pay [see Acharyya (2005), for example]. We, however, abstract
here from such distinction between willingness and ability to pay.
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With these speciÞcations, we consider the following timing in the decisions
taken by the agents in our model, Þrst, welfare maximizing governments in
countries H and L simultaneously choose whether or not to allow parallel imports
and whether or not to implement strict IPR respectively. Second, the Þrm
in the H-country decides the quality of the drug. Third, the Þrm in the L-
country chooses the quality of the imitated drug, thereafter, the innovator and
the imitator set their prices. Finally, the consumers in each decide whether to
buy the drug, and in if relevant which one to buy.
In what follows, we obtain the innovation, price and national welfare levels
under each of the four possible combination of regimes: strict-IPR regime in
both countries with and without parallel imports allowed by the H-country,
and a weak-IPR regime in L-country with and without parallel imports allowed
by the H-country. Finally, we will discuss Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
strategy choices for the governments  choice over strict and weak IPR for the
L-country government, and choice over allowing and not allowing PI for the
H-country government.
Using backwards induction, we start with the decisions faced by consumers in
each country. First, note that, regardless of whether the H-country government
allows parallel imports or not, consumers there can only consume the drug
innovated by the patent protected innovator, that is, exports of the imitated
drug to the H-country are not possible. Hence, their purchase decision is
determined by the non-negative value of net-utility yK(|> v> S K) as deÞned in
expression (3) above. However, for the consumers in L-country the choice is two-
fold, if a weak IPR regime is implemented and if the innovated drug is locally
imitated. First is whether to participate in the market, and second is which
drug, original innovated one or the locally imitated one, to buy. These decisions
are dictated by the following individually rational (IR) and self-selection (SS)
or incentive-compatible constraints respectively:
yO(|> v> S ) = |v S  0> (4)
yO(|> v> S O)  yO(|> v> S ) =, |v  S O  |v S> (5)
where, S is the price of the locally imitated and produced drug and S O is the
price charged by the innovator in the L-country. Of course, the SS constraint
is relevant only if the imitator Þrm enters. A strict IPR regime will prevent
imitation. In addition, given our assumption of Þxed costs of acquiring an
imitation technology, the innovator might choose to deter entry. In both these
cases, only the IR constraint that ensures the non-negative value of net-utility
yO(|> v> S O) will matter.
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3 Firm strategies under alternative policy
regimes
3.1 Strict IPR and MBD
Let S mG and vG denote respectively the price in country-j market and the
innovated quality under MBD. Let |mG be the marginal consumer in country-j
market who derives zero net beneÞt from the price, quality menu (S mG, vG)





By the tie-breaking rule, the marginal (and indierent) consumers buy the drug.
Since consumers with higher income derive greater beneÞts, so all these buyers
buy the drug as for them the individual-rational constraint is satisÞed. Thus,
if |m ? |

mG, the buyers with smaller income than |m do not buy the drug and
the country-j market is partially covered. On the other hand, if |m A |

mG, all
buyers in country-j buy the drug, and the markets are fully covered.
Thus, in case of partial market coverage, given the uniform and unit

















For any innovation level, proÞt maximization yields the following




vG|m > m = O>K= (8)





The following lemma speciÞes the parametric conÞgurations underlying
dierent combinations of the extent of market coverage at equilibrium under
MBD.
Lemma 1 Under MBD, when the L-country implements a strict IPR regime,
the MNC covers
i) each country market partially for all |m ?
1
2|m , m = K>O














All these claims follow from the proÞt-maximizing choice of the extent of
market coverage as speciÞed in (9). In rest of the analyses we will assume
that the intra-country income disparity is su!ciently large in the sense that
|m ?
1
2|m > m = K>O. Hence, at equilibrium both country markets are only
partially served, because otherwise the often quoted market-access argument in
favour of a weak IPR regime in the L-country does not make sense ex ante.

















3.2 Weak IPR and MBD
Under a weak IPR regime in the L-country, a local producer learns about the
production technology by investing a sum I and chooses an inferior quality of
the drug, evG 5 [0> evG), where evG denote the quality of the drug innovated by
the MNC under the threat of imitation. The lower price of this imitated drug,eS , compared to that charged by the MNC, eS OG induces some of the low-income
buyers who would otherwise buy the original drug to switch to the imitated
drug. This, in turn, forces the MNC to lower the price of the innovated drug.
Alternatively, the MNC may deter entry by setting a limit quality, which we
deÞne later, provided of course it is relatively proÞtable to do so. As we will see
later, such a decision to deter entry depends on the level of Þxed cost.
When the potential imitator enters and the innovator MNC accommodates
entry, given the IR and SS constraints as deÞned in (4) and (5), the segmentation
of the market demand in the L-country for the imitated and innovated varieties
of the drug are as follows. All consumers with income | 5 [e|G> e|OG) buy the
imitated drug whereas all buyers with income |  e|OG buy the original drug
where e|G = eSGevG and e|OG = eS

OG  eSGevG  evG . Note that as a tie-breaking rule, we
assume that the indierent buyer with income e|G buys the original innovated
drug. Hence, assuming e|G A |O the demand in the low income country for the
imitated and innovated drugs are
[e|OG  e|G] = eS OG  eSGevG  evG 
eSGevG (12)
and
[|O  e|OG] = |O  eS OG  eSGevG  evG (13)
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respectively. Hence, proÞt maximization yields the following prices and the
quality level for the innovator and imitator:
eS OG = 14evG|O> (14)




The above results in the following levels of innovated and imitated quality




It is easy to check that the MNC innovates a lower quality under the threat
of imitation. The reason for this is simple. The price competition from a local
imitator forces the MNC to lower the price of the innovated drug and since
innovation is costly, it saves upon the innovation cost by innovating a lower
quality. However, the lower price compensates the eect of the lowered quality
resulting in greater coverage of the L-country market by the MNC
|OG  e|OG = 12|O  512|O A 0= (19)
That is, the MNC now caters to an additional (|OG  e|OG) number of poorer
buyers whom it would exclude from the market under a stronger IPR. We
summarize the results in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 When the innovator accommodates entry under a weak IPR regime
in the L-country, the threat of imitation lowers both the innovation level and the
price, but raises the extent of market coverage at the low-end of the L-country
market compared to a stronger IPR regime.
Note that buyers even poorer than those served by the MNC, viz., with
income | 5 [e|G> e|OG) can also access the drug, albeit the inferior quality
imitated one.
The greater market coverage by the MNC is the competitive eect of a weak
IPR regime. Of course, the above analysis presumes that it is worthwhile for
the lower income country Þrm to enter the market and imitate the innovated
drug by incurring the Þxed cost. If entry occurs, the proÞts realized for the
innovating MNC and the imitating local Þrm are the following:










For the local Þrm entry is worthwhile only if the cost of imitation is
su!ciently low:
I ? IG = eG (evG) = (22)
Otherwise, for higher Þxed costs of imitation, entry is blockaded and a weak IPR
regime does not pose any threat to the innovator.10 When entry is blockaded,
the MNC innovates the same quality vG as it would under a strict IPR and
prices out the poorer buyers in the L-country market having income less than
|OG. However, even if entry is not blockaded it may still be proÞtable for the
MNC strategically deter entry. Realizing that the local imitators potential
proÞt (obtained in (21)) varies directly with the innovated quality evG>the MNC
can innovate a lower limit quality evGo which, for any given I , deters entry by
pushing the net potential proÞt for the local imitator to zero. From (22), using
(21), such a limit quality equals,
evGo = 48|2OI= (23)
Since in our assumed timing of decisions, the quality levels are committed
(sequentially) by the innovator and the imitator before the prices are chosen, by
innovating this entry-deterring limit quality the MNC can charge the monopoly
prices in the two markets in the same way as it would under a stronger IPR
regime. Thus, the prices set by the MNC under the entry-deterring limit quality
would be similar to what has been speciÞed in (8):
eS omG = 12evGo|m > m = K>O= (24)
Two observations are in order, which we state in the lemma that follows.
Lemma 3 Under a [weak IPR,MBD] policy regime, if the innovator chooses to
deter entry, it produces a lower quality and lowers the price. The quality and
price declines are proportional such that the L-country market is covered to the
same extent as under a strict IPR regime.
Proof. Since, the limit quality is monotonically increasing in I , it is
su!cient to show that evGo ¡IG¢ = evG. Using (21) and (22),
evGo ¡IG¢ = 148 £12|2K + 7|2O¤
= evG=






|O ? |O, hence, our earlier assumption
implies that IG A 0=
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On the other hand, denoting the indierent income under entry deterrence byb|OG, we get,
b|OG = eS oOGevGo = 12|O = |OG=
Hence the claim.
Note that, given Lemmas 2 and 3, under a [weak IPR,MBD] policy regime,
there is less market coverage in the L-country is less when the entry is deterred
than when it is accommodated. This brings out the essential dierence between
the entry-accommodating and the entry-deterring strategies. Under the entry-
accommodating strategy, the MNC responds to the weak IPR regime by
innovating a smaller quality but by lowering (the post entry duopoly) price
more than proportionately it actually covers a greater fraction of the L-country
market. On the other hand, under the entry-deterring strategy, by committing
to an even lower quality, despite lowering the (monopoly) price proportionately
and thus serving the same number of buyers in the L-country as under a stronger
IPR regime, the MNC squeezes the potential price-cost margin for the imitator
su!ciently to make entry unproÞtable for any Þxed cost of imitation.
All these discussions are, however, relevant only if it is worthwhile for the
MNC to deter entry. The following lemma however, proves that this will not be
the case under the present policy regime.
Lemma 4 Under a [weak IPR,MBD] policy regime, the innovator will always
accommodate entry. On the other hand, entry is blockaded if I A IG=
Proof. See Appendix.
That is, if it is worthwhile for the local imitator to enter, the MNC always
accommodates him. Essentially entry deterrence is worthwhile only for too high
a Þxed cost, but for that Þxed cost the local imitator itself chooses not to enter
(i.e., entry is blockaded).
3.3 Strict IPR and parallel imports
Suppose the H-country allows parallel imports of the drug from the L-country.
Arbitrage then forces the MNC is forced to charge a uniform price S s across
the countries. Let |s denote the marginal consumers in each country market






For the same reason as already spelled out above, if | ? |s > both the markets
are partially covered. In that case, the proÞt of the MNC equals,
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Proceeding as before, the proÞt-maximizing uniform price, for any given




[|K + |O] vs= (26)




[|K + |O] = (27)
Note that by our earlier assumption that | ? 12|O, the MNC serves both the
markets partially under parallel imports, provided, of course, the L-country
market is served at all, which requires that 3|O A |K = In rest of our analysis,
we will assume that the cross-country income disparity is not too large so that
under PI the MNC does cater to both the countries.









[|K + |O]3 = (29)
Note that vs ? vG, which is the under-investment result of Valletti (2006):
parallel imports lowers the innovation level.11
3.4 Weak IPR and parallel imports
Finally, we consider the case where the L-country does not enforce a strict IPR
regime and the H-country allows parallel import of the original drug from the
L-country. Let eS s and eSs be the prices of the original and imitated drug, andevs be the level of quality of the innovated drug when entry is accommodated.
Proceeding as before,12 it is straightforward to check that, when entry is
accommodated, consumers in the H and L-country having at least income levelse|Ks and e|Os respectively purchase the innovation, where:
11This result has been generalized in Acharyya (2008) for all possible parametric
conÞguration  very large, moderately large, small and very small intra-country demand
dispersions  resulting in unilateral and universal partial and full market coverages as
equilibrium outcomes.
12Firms in countries H and L maximize proÞt functions
⁄Ws = ⁄SWs
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e|Ks = eS sevs = 2
¡evs  evs¢
8evs  5evs (|K + |O) > (30)
e|Os = eS s  eSsevs  evs = 2ev

s  evs
8evs  5evs (|K + |O) = (31)
On the other hand, in the L-country, the consumers having at least the
income level e|s (less than e|Os) buy the imitated drug, where e|s is such that,
e|s = eSsevs = ev

s  evs
8evs  5evs (|K + |O) = (32)
Given the above segmentation of the L-country market, the entry
accommodating proÞt-maximizing innovation level equal
evs = 796 (|K + |O)2 > (33)
evs = 8
11
evs = 56(11) (96) (|K + |O)2 (34)
and proÞts are
es = 12 ¡evs¢2 = 492 (96)2 (|K + |O)4 = (35)
Note, that once again, the level of innovation is smaller than that under a
strict IPR regime (with PI), evs ? vs. On the other hand, note that the local
imitator enters the market for all I ? I s, where I s is such that
I s = es = 7
4 (48)2
(|K + |O)4 (36)
under an entry-deterring strategy the MNC innovates the limit quality evso such




⁄s 3 I = ⁄Ss





















The proÞt that is realized for the MNC from the entry-deterring strategy
equals,
eso = 12I  (96)2
2 (|K + |O)4
I 2= (38)
Lemma 5 Under a [weak IPR,PI] policy regime, the MNC deters entry by
setting a limit quality evso speciÞed in (37) for all I 5 ¡I s>urrw> I s¤ = On the









(|K + |O)4 = (39)
Proof. See Appendix.
Once again, imitation by a local Þrm lowers the proÞt of the MNC. however,
there is one essential dierence. Under MBD, though the MNC was forced to
compete with the local imitator in the L-country, it could still charge monopoly
price in its own country. But now under PI, it must charge a uniform price
in both the markets and thus prospect of imitation lowers the MNCs proÞt
in both the markets. The limit quality enables the MNC to charge the (non-
discriminatory, uniform) monopoly price. At the same time, there are proÞt
losses from the lower limit quality. This is due to smaller market coverage
compared to that under accommodation because the price in the L-country
is raised more than proportionately. Since the magnitude of this loss varies
inversely with the level of limit quality and hence with the value of I , for
su!ciently large values of I , proÞt gains outweigh proÞt losses and thus entry
deterrence becomes relatively proÞtable.
4 Policy choices
Let us now consider the policy choices by the two national governments. Each
government maximizes national welfare levels which is simply the sum of the
consumers surplus and the proÞt of its native Þrm. For the L country, the
imitators proÞt (net of the Þxed imitation cost) matters only when a weak
IPR is implemented there and entry is accommodated by the innovating H-Þrm.
Otherwise, the national welfare in the L-country is simply the consumers surplus,
for any given price-quality menu chosen by the innovator. For example, The
national welfare levels when a weak IPR is implemented in the L-country and













³evG|  eS G´ g|
6







³evG|  eS KG´ g|
6
:8+ eG (41)
where, the proÞt levels are as deÞned above. (Referee#1s main comment
#2 is that we have not defined national welfare anywhere.
That is why I have added the above sentences and the algebraic
expressions.)
As evident from the above discussions, the level of Þxed cost of imitation
inßuence the Þrm strategies. This will in turn aect welfare levels. The SPNE
policy choices thus vary accordingly. However, we will conÞne ourselves with
only the range of Þxed costs for which entry is not blockaded, i.e., it is worthwhile
for the potential local imitator to enter the market under a weak IPR when the
MNC does not deter entry. Since IG ? IS for the relevant range of incomes,
it is enough to assume,
I ? IG= (42)
On the other hand, though I s>urrw ? I s , I s>urrw may be greater than IG for
some high cross-country income dierences as shown in Figure 1.13 In that case,
given the assumption in (42), the parametric values for which I s>urrw is greater
than IG will mean that the MNC will accommodate entry under both MBD
and PI. Thus, we have only two distinctly dierent cases (as speciÞed in the
Lemma below) when the levels of highest incomes in the two countries are such
that,
I s>urrw ? IG= (43)
Otherwise, we have only one of these cases, or to be more precise, the case which
we label below as Case II.
Lemma 6 When the L-government implements a weak IPR regime, under the
assumptions (42)-(43), the relevant parametric conÞgurations that lead to two
dierent payo structures of the policy game are as follows. For all I such that,
Case I: IG A I A I s>urrw= The MNC accommodates entry under MBD and
deters entry under PI . Thus, either fZmG or fZms(evso) m = O>K> are realized
according as the policy choice of the H-country.
Case II: I s>urrw A I A 0. The MNC accommodates entry under both MBD
and PI. The welfare levels realized are either fZmG or fZms, m = O>K
Proof. Follows directly from Lemmata 2-5 and the discussions above.
The two cases speciÞed in the above lemma exhaust all the possibilities
regarding the implications of the policy game between the governments,
irrespective of how large the cross-country income dierences are within the
13The diagram is drawn letting |K = w|O and then normalizing |O to unity; the relevant
range of cross-country dierence is thus given by the interval [1> 3] for the parameter w=
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limit for which both the markets are served by the MNC. Note that I ? I s>urrw
? IG would corresponds to Ichinos (2004) policy game, extended to endogenous
innovation decision. Figure 2 represents the payo matrix for countries to
summarize the notation for all the possible welfare levels. Figure 4 in the
Appendix provides the expressions for each of those welfare levels. By simply
comparing the dierent welfare levels we immediately obtain following results:
Lemma 7 Under MBD, the L-country unambiguously gains from weak IPR
whereas the H-country unambiguously loses.
As formally shown in the appendix, fZOG  IG A ZOG . Since the net
welfare is monotonically decreasing in I and the least value in the relevant
range is fZOG  IG, then,fZOG  I A ZOG ; I 5 £0> IG¤ = (44)
It is also straightforward to prove that
fZKG ? ZKG . (45)
The gain from a weak IPR regime when entry is accommodated comes from
two sources. First is the greater market coverage: the MNC caters to some
poorer consumers whom it would not cater to under a stronger IPR, and the
even poorer buyers who cannot still buy the original drug, can now buy the
low-priced imitated drug. Second is the decline in the price of the original drug
for all other buyers, which being more than proportional to a lower quality of
the original drug, raises the net surplus for all intra-marginal buyers. This is an
interesting result which provides a theoretical justiÞcation for poorer countries
reluctance to implement strict IPR regime.
However, the welfare of the H-country is strictly lower under a weak IPR
because imitation lowers proÞt of the MNC and also welfare of the consumers in
the H-country because of the lower innovated quality. The price decline cannot
compensate the buyers in the H-country for the lower quality as it does in the
L-country because the buyers there have a higher marginal willingness to pay
for higher quality.
Lemma 8 Under strict IPR, the L-country unambiguously gains from MBD
whereas the H-country unambiguously loses.
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that the quality of the innovated drug now is lower whereas the
(uniform) price is higher compared to the lower discriminatory price charged
to buyers in the L-country. Thus, whereas some low-income buyers in the L-
country are now driven out of the market, those who still buy the drug are
worse-o due to lower innovated quality and higher price. So on all accounts
the national welfare under PI declines below that under MBD for the L-country.
On the other hand, the source of gain from PI for the H-country is the price
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reduction and the consequent greater market coverage since by (9) and (27),
|K  |s =
1
4
[|K  |O] A 0. As shown in the appendix, this gain appears to be
large enough to outweigh the welfare losses arising out of lower innovation and
lower proÞt for its MNC. This welfare result captures the popular belief that
parallel imports beneÞt only the richer countries.
We can now examine SPNE policy choices for each possible level of Þxed costs
already referred to as case I and case II. The following proposition summarizes
our results:
Proposition 9 In the above policy game, there are two SPNE policy choices 
(Strict IPR, PI) and (weak IPR and MBD)  for high Þxed costs of imitation
(case I: IG A I A I s>urrw) for which entry is deterred under PI when a weak
IPR regime is implemented in the L-country. For low Þxed cost of imitation
(case II: I s>urrw A I A 0) for which entry is accommodated under PI, (weak
IPR and MBD) emerges as the unique SPNE policy choices.
Proof: See Appendix for details.
First, in Case I, it can be checked that (Strict IPR, PI) is a SPNE policy
regime. To see this, Þrst of all note from Lemma 8 that when the L-country
implements a strict IPR regime, PI is the best strategy for the H-country. On
the other hand, note that fZOs(evSo) is monotonically increasing in the Þxed cost
of imitation (see Table 4) and is strictly less than ZOs for I close to I s= For
I = I s, entry is blockaded so that essentially the weak IPR regime with entry
deterrence boils down to the strict IPR regime. But, as I falls below I s, entry
is feasible, and the MNC deters entry by the limit quality which is strictly lower
than the innovation level under strict IPR with PI. As argued earlier in Lemma
3, it also lowers its (discriminatory) monopoly price but only proportionately
to cover the L-country market to the same extent as it would under a stronger
IPR. Thus, the market coverage under a weak IPR (with entry deterrence) is the
same as that under a stronger IPR when the H-country allows PI. But the lower
quality reduces welfare more than the lower price raises it for the intra-marginal
buyers because they have successively greater marginal willingness-to-pay for
higher qualities. That is, lower innovation hurts these buyers more than lower
price beneÞts them. Overall the welfare falls below what the L-country could
get under a stronger IPR. Moreover, this net welfare loss is successively higher,
smaller is the level of Þxed cost of imitation. Hence,
fZOs(evso) ? ZOs ; I ? IG= (46)
Thus, the L-country should choose a strict IPR regime when the H-country
allows PI. This makes (Strict IPR and PI) a SPNE policy pair.
Second, still in Case I, strict IPR is not a strictly dominant strategy for the
L-country government because by Lemma 7, country Ls welfare is higher under
weak IPR when the H-country chooses MBD. In addition, in the appendix we
prove that fZKG A fZKs(evso)= Hence, (weak IPR and MBD) is also a SPNE in
case I. This is an interesting but not counter-intuitive result. Implementing a
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weak IPR is worthwhile for the L-country when the H-country chooses MBD
because entry of the local imitator is not deterred by the MNC in this subcase.
And given the potential threat of imitation (because it is not worthwhile for the
MNC to deter entry), the H-country government realizes that the full beneÞts of
PI cannot be obtained. Thus, the threat of imitation induces the H-country to
allow MBD which though lowers the market coverage in the H-country, results
in higher innovation and therefore, improved health-care quality. But, if the
H-country can eliminate the threat of imitation by ensuring implementation of
a stronger IPR regime, then the full beneÞts of PI can be realized (despite a
lower innovation level) and PI is chosen over MBD, resulting in the other SPNE.
These multiple SPNE brings out the conßicting interests of the developing and
the developed world in implementing TRIPS. The implementation of strict IPR
is not a unique optimum choice of the low-income countries. But if this is no
longer a policy choice for them as a consequence of WTO commitments, then it
is in the best interest of the richer countries like the EU and Japan to allow for
parallel imports through regional or international exhaustion of patent rights.
Now, consider Case II where entry of a local imitator under a weak IPR
regime in the L-country is always accommodated by the MNC regardless of
whether the H-country allows PI or not. First of all, note that since now the
MNC accommodates the local imitator, when the H country chooses PI, there is
scope for welfare gain for the L-country from a weak IPR. Though under a weak
IPR the MNC lowers its innovation level compared to that under a stronger IPR
(i.e., evs ? vs), by Lemma 4, it covers a larger market in the L-country. The
buyers who would have purchased the drug even under a stronger IPR (i.e., those
with income |s and higher) would lose no doubt because their higher marginal
willingness to pay for a higher quality means that they are hurt more by the
lower innovation than they are beneÞtted from the price decline. But the poorer
buyers who are now served by the MNC (i.e., those with income higher thane|s but lower than |s ) will unambiguously gain. The other two sets of agents
who gain from implementation of a weak IPR when the H-country chooses PI,
are those who buy the imitated drug and the local imitator itself as it earns
strictly positive (net) proÞt. Thus, we can expect an overall welfare increase
unless the welfare loss from lower innovation is too large. What we show in




, and for all relevant range of cross-country income dierences, the L-country
unambiguously gains from the weak IPR when the H-country allows parallel
imports. That is, the welfare loss from lower innovation is outweighed by the
gains spelled out above.
This welfare ranking rules out (strict IPR, PI) as a SPNE in case II since
weak IPR is now a strictly dominant strategy for the L-country (similar to what
Ichino (2004) observed). Therefore, the existence of a SPNE in this case II boils
down to the best-response of the H-country when a weak IPR is implemented
in the L-country. As detailed out in the appendix, the H-country gains from
allowing MBD instead of PI when the L-country implements a weak IPR regime,
hence (weak IPR and MBD) emerges as the unique SPNE policy regime.
The nature of SPNE policy choices, multiple or unique, reveals an interesting
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feature: Entry deterring limit quality is never realized at the SPNE. Because,
the threat of entry deterrence makes a weak IPR regime suboptimal for the
L-country regardless of whether the H-country chooses MBD or PI, and thus
forces it to implement a stronger IPR regime whenever it is relatively proÞtable
for the MNC to deter entry by innovating a limit quality.
5 Discussions
In this section we discuss, Þrst, the welfare and e!ciency properties of the two
SPNE policy choices derived above, and second, a special case of the above
policy game where the choice of the L-government is over allowing and not
allowing compulsory licensing.
5.1 Properties of SPNE policy choices
What appears from Proposition 9 is that the obligations of countries as members
of the WTO to implement the TRIPS has two implications. First, in the
context of multiple SPNE  (Strict IPR, PI) and (Weak IPR, MBD)  as in
Case I , TRIPS is essentially an instrument of equilibrium selection. Second,
when (Strict IPR, PI) is not a SPNE, such as in case II, TRIPS enforces policy
regimes which would not have been (non-cooperatively) chosen by the countries.
Under these circumstance, it is interesting to compare the e!ciency and welfare
properties of (Strict IPR, PI) being enforced by the TRIPS with the other SPNE
policy choice. We make comparisons of the two SPNE policy choices in terms
of four key variables: the extent of market coverage, the level of innovation,
national welfare levels, and global welfare level (Figures 3 and 4 summarize
equilibrium quality, price and welfare levels).
First, it is readily veriÞable (using (9), (19) and (27)) that the MNC covers a
smaller segment of the L-country market and a larger segment of the H-country
market at the (strict IPR, PI)-SPNE than at the (weak IPR, MBD)-SPNE.14
Moreover, the buyers in the L-country even poorer than e|OG can also buy the
drug, albeit the imitated one, at the (weak IPR, MBD)-SPNE.
Second, recall that under MBD, the threat of imitation and ensuing
competition with the local imitator induces the MNC to innovate a lower quality.
Also, under a strict IPR, price arbitrage has similar adverse innovation eect.
However, whether imitation has a stronger disincentive for innovation compared
to that of PI or not when both policies are combined depends on the cross-
country income disparity. For cross-country income dierences su!ciently large
in the sense that |K A 1=8|O , innovation level is higher at the (Weak IPR,
MBD)-SPNE than under (Strict IPR, PI).15
Turning to the national welfare levels, recall that we have already established
that the L-country unambiguously looses at the (strict IPR, PI)-SPNE compared
14Simply note that |S = 14 (|O + |K) A
5
12




⁄|WKG = |WKG .
15Simply by comparing ⁄vWG and vWs.
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to the other SPNE (see equation (46)). For the H-country, on the other
hand, welfare increases at the WTO-compliant SPNE, i.e., fZKG ? ZKs (see
appendix). Finally, it is possible to prove that the total or global welfare under
a (strict IPR, PI) is unambiguously lower than that under (weak IPR, MBD).
Thus, the WTO-compliant SPNE is not even globally welfare improving over
the other SPNE.
These results clearly bring out the implications of enforcing the (strict IPR,
PI)-SPNE through member countries obligation to implement the TRIPS. More
precisely,
Proposition 10 In the above context, implementation of a strict IPR regime
by WTO commitments make the poor country unambiguously worse o in terms
of both market coverage and national welfare. The level of innovation may be
lower as well when cross country income disparity is large enough in the sense
deÞned above. The rich country unambiguously gains but the welfare gain is
smaller than the welfare loss suered by the poor country.
Proof. It is su!cient to note that when the L-country implements strict
IPR regime under WTO commitment, the H-country chooses PI. Thus, WTO
commitments enforce (Strict IPR, PI) regime regardless of whether it is a SPNE
policy regime or not. See appendix for details.
Indeed it is also possible to proof that (weak IPR, MBD) results in the
highest level of global welfare relative to all the other possible policy regimes
(subgame perfect or not) (see appendix).
There is an interesting link to the empirical work of Chaudhuri et al. (2006).
In our paper, introduction of TRIPS under PI implies an increase in the price
of the MNC product being sold abroad of around 343% under price arbitrage
(this increase is consistent with Chaudhuri, Goldberg and Jia (2006)). The
introduction of TRIPS under MBD would generate a lower increase in prices.
However, even for the biggest income dierence allowed in our model the price
increase would be around 278%. However, for us the most relevant price
comparison is that between the two SPNE outcomes: (Strict IPR, PI) and
(Weak IPR, MBD). It is possible to prove that this will most likely lead to the
highest price increases (see Appendix).
5.2 Compulsory licensing versus parallel imports
As we have mentioned earlier, a large number of countries had allowed CL
in the pre-TRIPS era and a strong case has often been made in favour of its
continuation under the new IPR regime [Correa (2000b)]. Canada has been a
country that had successfully implemented CL during from the 1920s. More
recently, India has allowed automatic CLs for mailbox applications. Even the
WTO (2002) recognizes its importance though instead of CL, the Article 31
refers to use without authorization of the right holder. It also does not place
any restrictions on the grounds under which a CL can be provided to a local
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non-patentee16 . In the 1923 Patent Act of Canada, a CL allowed the licensee
the right to manufacture, use or sell a patented innovation before the patent
expires without the consent of the patent holder and in exchange the licensee
was required to pay a royalty. This royalty was then paid to the patent holder.
Given this perspective, suppose instead of the choice over a stronger and
a weak IPR regime, the L-country has a choice over allowing or not allowing
a CL. The important dierence that we now have is regarding the proÞt of
the local Þrm and consequently the welfare of the L-country. The local Þrm
with CL can now produce the patented drug without incurring any signiÞcant
development cost, F. But it has to pay a royalty to the local authority which is
then transferred to the patent holder. Suppose, as a benchmark case, the royalty
is a Þxed sum, R, decided by the L-country government. The innovators net
proÞt under CL equals eG +U or es +U whereas the local Þrms proÞt equalseG U or es U according as the H-country does not and does allow PI. For
the L-country government, the choice now is not just over whether to provide
CL to the local Þrm or not, but also over the royalty amount. By Lemma 3 and
4, it is immediate that in case the L-country government provides CL, it would
set the royalty levels below Ul, l = G> s, where Ul is such that el = Ul. Note
that given Propositions 1 and 2 above, the L-government can ensure a higher
welfare level by setting any royalty less than I s>urrw. However, since CZOCU ? 0,
so the L-government will set U = 0. The policy game thus boils down to case
II discussed above with (CL, MBD) as the unique SPNE policy choice.
6 Conclusion
We have examined a policy game between a low-income and a high-income
country over patent protection and international exhaustion of patent rights (or
parallel imports) of an on-patent drug. The policy choices are shown to depend
on the level of Þxed cost of imitation by a local Þrm in the low-income country.
For a moderately high Þxed cost for which entry is not blockaded but is deterred
under PI when the low-income country implements a weak IPR, both (Strict
IPR, PI) and (Weak IPR, MBD) emerge as the SPNE policy choices. In such
a context, the WTO commitment to implement a strict IPR regime appears
as a mechanism for equilibrium selection as it enforces the (Strict IPR, PI).
The low-income country, however, suers a welfare loss from implementation
of such a SPNE policy regime, which is even larger than the welfare gain for
the high-income country. For relatively smaller Þxed cost, (Weak IPR, MBD)
emerges as the unique SPNE policy choice, because now that the MNC always
accommodates the local imitator, it is worthwhile for the low-income country
to implement a weak IPR regardless of the policy choice of the high-income
country.
16 It though speciÞes certain conditions which include that the non-patentee must have
made eorts to get a voluntary license on reasonable commercial terms, and the CL can be
terminated if and when the circumstances which led it cease to exist and are unlikely to occur.
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The robustness of the above results needs to be examined with respect to
endogeneity of imitation cost, which constitutes our future research agenda.
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Figure 1. Comparison of critical Þxed costs ( |K = w|O> |O = 1, w 5 [1> 3]).
Cases Range of Fixed Costs
Payoff Matrix
Strategy Sets: 
L: Strict IPR, Weak IPR; H: MBD, PI
Case I
Case II
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Figure 2. The policy game (assuming I ? IG and I s>urrw ? IG).
Srolf| uhjlph lqqrydwhg txdolw| sulfh lq frxqwu| O








zhdnLSU> PEG evG = 148 £12|2K + 7|2O¤ eS OG = 18|O ¡ 132 ¡12|2K + 7|2O¢¢
vwulfwLSU> SL vs = 18 [|K + |O]




evso = 96I(|K+|O)2 eS s (evso) = 24I(|K+|O)
zhdnLSU> SL
(LL)DFFRPPRGDWLRQ
evs = 796 (|K + |O)2 eS s (evs) = 7768 (|K + |O)3
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Figure 3: Price and quality outcomes
Appendix
A.1. Proof of Lemma 4: entry deterring vs. accommodating
strategy under MBD
The proÞt that is realized for the MNC from the entry-deterring strategy



















and that eGo reaches a maximum for I = bIG = 1192 ¡|2O + |2K¢ |2O = 12 eIG=





= It follows that eIG A bIG A IG.
Therefore, eGo is monotonically increasing in I in the relevant range, i.e., for
all I ? IG. On the other hand, the maximum proÞt of the MNC under entry-
deterring strategy equals,
eGo ³ bIG´ = 132 ¡|2O + |2K¢ =
Let I G be such that eG = eGo (I G) = Recalling the proÞt levels under the entry



























¢2  |2K + 712|2O
¸26
8 (A.3)
Note that I G>urrw is the smaller root of the critical level of Þxed cost I G such
that eGo (I G) = eG. But, it can be checked that I G>urrw A IG. Hence, it is not
worthwhile for the MNC to deter entry for all I ? IG. The comparison of proÞt
levels for the MNC under the entry accommodating and deterring strategies is
shown in Figure 1.
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A.2. Proof of Lemma 5: entry deterring vs. accommodating
strategies under PI
It is readily veriÞable that although the proÞt that realized for the MNC from
the entry-deterring strategy, eso (stated in equation (38)) is inverted-U shaped,
it is monotonically increasing in the relevant range of Þxed cost of imitation by
the local Þrm, viz. for all I  I s.
Ceso
CI A 0 ; I ?
bIs = (|K + |O)4
16 (48)
= (A.4)
But, bIs A I s, which can be checked by recalling the value of I s from (36) in
the text:








CI A 0 ; I ? I s. Moreover, eso(I s) = 1442 (96)2 (|K + |O)4 A es Aeso(0)=
Hence, as long as eso(I ) is continuous, there exists a value of I ? I s,
denoted by I s>urrw such that17 eso(I s>urrw) = es. From (38) and (35), we obtain









(|K + |O)4 =
It is straighforward to prove that the smaller root of the above is smaller
than I s= Similarly, it can be checked that I s ? larger I S>urrw. Hence, for the
relevant range of Þxed costs, viz., I  I s, only the smaller root of I S is relevant
such that given (A.9), eso(I ) A es ; I 5 ¡I S>urrw> I s¤ =It can be veriÞed that
I s>urrw ? I s and IG ? IS .
A.3. Welfare outcomes
Srolf| uhjlph Frxqwu| K0v zhoiduh
vwulfwLSU> PEG ZKG = [
2|2K+|2O](|2O+|2K)
32
zhdnLSU> PEG fZKG = [24|2K+7|2O](12|2K+7|2O)(48)(96)
vwulfwLSU> SL ZKs = [
11|2K+3|2O2|K|O](|K+|O)2
256











zhdnLSU> SL(LL) fZKs = 7[161|2K14|K|O+17|2O](|K+|O)28(48)(96)
17Actually there are two roots for critical value of I for which proÞts under entry deterrence




Srolf| uhjlph Frxqwu| O0v zhoiduh
vwulfwLSU> PEG ZOG =
|2O[|2O+|2K]
32
zhdnLSU> PEG fZOG  I = 7348 [12|2K+7|2O]|2O144  I
vwulfwLSU> SL ZOs = [3|O|K ]
2(|K+|O)2
256
zhdnLSU> SL(L) fZOs (evso) = 3(3|O|K)2(|K+|O)2 I
zhdnLSU> SL(LL) fZOs  I = 7[9|2K30|K|O+153|2O](|K+|O)28(48)(96)  I
Table 4b.
Note that since under entry deterrence, the MNC charges the same (uniform)
monopoly price as when there is no threat of imitation under a stronger IPR
implemented in the L-country, so once again the L-country market will be served
at all as long as 3|O A |K . Thus, fZOs(evso) A 0 only for the limited range of
cross-country income disparity. Also note that fZKs(evso) is strictly positive only
for I ? I 0 
¡





A.4. Proof of Lemma 7: welfare under MBD: weak vs strong IPR
It is enough to check that
³fZOG  IG´ A ZOG= First note that



































































Now consider the terms within the curly bracket on the RHS (denoting it as
N):
N = 14|2K|O  5|3K + 4|3O
= |2K(15|O  |K) + |O(4|2O  |2K) = 5|2K(3|O  |K) + |O(2|O + |K)(2|O  |K)=
Thus, for all |K  2|O> the term N is strictly positive so that given |O ? |K >
ZKG ? ZKs=
For |K 5 [2|O> 3|O], note the following:






|4O =ZKs(|K = 2|O) (A.7)
and
ZKG(|K = 3|O) = 7=6|4O ? 28=17|4O =ZKs(|K = 3|O)= (A.8)
Since both ZKG and ZKs are monotonically increasing in |K , so (A.6) and
(A.8) imply that ZKG ? ZKs for all |K 5 [2|O> 3|O].















Hence, ZKG ? ZKs=
A.6. Proof of Proposition 9
³fZKG A fZKs(evso);I 5 £0> IG¤´
First, note that fZKs(evso) is maximum at
I 00 
¡





Evaluating fZKs(evso) at this level of Þxed cost we get the maximum welfare
level for the L-country under weak IPR when the MNC deters entry:
fZKs(evso> I 00) = (96)(108)
(32)2 (216)2
¡




fZKGfZKs(evso> I 00) = 1
(48) (96)
£
119|4K + 24|4O + 118|2K|2O  52|3K|O  20|K|3O
¤
=
which is strictly positive for all relevant cross-country income dierences as
evident from the following diagram (which is drawn letting |K = w|O and then
normalizing |O to unity; the relevant range of cross-country dierence is thus








Therefore, since fZKs(evso) is monotonically increasing in I up to I 00,fZKG A fZKs(evso) ; I 5 £0> IG¤ =
A.7. Proof of fZOs  I ? ZOs for all I ? I S>urrw
First, we deÞne a critical Þxed cost IO such that, fZOs  IO = ZOs. If
such an IO exists, then by the monotonicity property of the welfare function we





654|K|O  81|2K  225|2O
¢
(|K + |O)2 =












654|K|O  81|2K  225|2O
¢
(|K + |O)2 >









(w+ 1)2  1
256(144)
¡
81w2 + 654w 225
¢
=
Hence, I S>urrw ? IO, and consequently, fZOsI ? ZOs for all I ? I S>urrw.
A.8. Proof of fZKG A fZKs
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First note:









We make |K = w|O and take |4O out to get:
} =
³
24 (w)2 + 7
´³











which we plot bellow for w 5 [1> 3] =
The above demostrates that fZKG A fZKs=
A.9. Proof of Proposition 10: welfare properties of SPNE policy
choices





























which we plot bellow for w 5 [1> 3] =
This shows that fZKG ? ZKS for all cross-country income dierences.
Hence, the H-country gains from implementation from the (Strict IPR, PI)
SPNE policy choices.
A.9.2. Global welfare under (weak IPR, MBD) vs (strict IPR, PI)³fZOG  I +fZKG A ZOs +ZKs´











































Hence we can conclude that global welfare is higher in the (weak IPR, MBD)
case.
A.9.3. Global welfare under (strict IPR, MBD) vs (strict IPR PI)
(ZOG +ZKG A ZOs +ZKs)































Hence, under the strict IPR regime, global welfare is higher with MBD.
A.9.4. Global welfare under (weak IPR, MBD) vs (strict IPR, MBD)³fZOG  I +fZKG A ZOG +ZKG´
















































Hence, we can conclude that fZOG  I +fZKG A ZOG +ZKG=
A.10. Price increase due to implementation of strict IPR
The relevant expressions are
S seS s = 247 >










32 (12w2 + 7)
¢ >




















By plotting all the above expressions, we can conclude that the most likely
higher price increases arise when going (Weak IPR, MBD) to (Strict IPR, PI)
(represented as the thicker line).
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